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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF COMMUNIST
CONTROL ACT OF 1954 DOES NOT APPLY TO
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
PROGRAM
Communist Party, U.SA. v. Catherwood
367 U.S. 389 (1961)
William Albertson applied for unemployment compensation under
the New York Unemployment Insurance Law.' He was denied these benefits
by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board on the ground that he had
been employed by the Communist Party. Under section 3 of the Com-
munist Control Act of 1954,2 the Communist Party had been removed
from the State's official roll of employers and therefore was not included
within the Unemployment Insurance Law. On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that because Albertson's employment with the
Communist Party had terminated before the Party had been removed
from the roll of employers, he was entitled to unemployment compensation.
However, the court ruled that the action of the State of New York, in
striking the Communist Party from the State's list of employers, was correct
under section 3 of the Communist Control Act.3 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari4 to consider petitioner's claims that (1) the
New York court had mistakenly construed the statute so as to compel the
removal of the Communist Party from the list of employers and (2) that
the statute itself was unconstitutional. The constitutional question was
never reached 5 as the Court reversed the New York interpretation on the
ground that a reading of the statute does not give rise to the inference that
it prevents the Communist Party from participating in state unemployment
insurance programs.6
Section 3 of the Communist Control Act contains a general statement
that the Communist Party is " . . . not entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision
thereof."'7 There is no definition included in the statute of the phrase "rights,
privileges and immunities," and there is little in the committee reports or
House and Senate debates that offers any specific meaning.8
I N.Y. Lab. Law. §§ 500-640 (1944).
2 Communist Control Act § 3, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1958).
3 In re Albertson's Claim, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 168 N.E.2d 242, 202 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1960).
4 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
5 Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939):
"The Supreme Court will not decide an issue of constitutionality of a statute
if the case may justly and reasonably be decided upon a construction of the
statute under which it is constitutional."
6 Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961).
7 Communist Control Act, supra note 2.
8 There are some vague statements made in debate in both Houses of Congress
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The New York Court of Appeals had adopted a broad interpretation
of the statute. It reasoned that employer participation in the unemployment
program is not merely a tax liability,9 but is also a highly advantageous
position. The advantage primarily inheres in the ability of the employer
to attract more competent employees by offering the security of unemploy-
ment benefits. The court held that the status of employer is a right or
privilege and that payment of a contribution is a condition to the right or
privilege. The fact that the Communist Party sought reinstatement as an
employer is further indication that the nature of participation is more
of an advantage than a disadvantage. Without further attempt to define
a right or privilege under the Act, the Court of Appeals reached the conclusion
that the State acted correctly in removing the Communist Party from the
unemployment insurance program.
The New York court assumed that Congress intended, by the general
wording of section 3 of the Communist Control Act, to prohibit the Com-
munist Party from participation in any state or federal "program" which
might prove beneficial to its avowed purpose of world domination. This
view finds some support in a review of congressional action with respect
to the Communist Party since 1940.10 The Supreme Court might well have
affirmed the New York Interpretation on the basis of congressional intent
expressed in the legislative history. However, had the broader interpretation
of the Court of Appeals been accepted, it would have raised a question as
to the constitutionality of the Act. 1 ' The Supreme Court has continually re-
such as, "What this bill really does is put the Communist Party, which is a conspiracy
outside the pale of the law, where it should be." 100 Cong. Rec. 14719 (1954) (Remarks
of Senator Ferguson).
) Contributions under the Unemployment Insurance Law are considered to be
taxes in New York. Parisi v. Industrial Comm'r, 8 Misc. 2d 260, 167 N.Y.S.2d 249
(1957). Taxes in New York have been defined as "burdens of a pecuniary nature"
in Hanson v. Griffiths, 204 Misc. 736, 124 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1953) and as "a statutory
liability" in People v. Chenango County, 39 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1943).
10 The Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958), was an
attempt to limit the activities of subversive organizations by making it a criminal
offense to advocate or teach concrete action for the violent overthrow of the United
States Government, or to knowingly belong to an organization that so advocates. The
latter clause, known as the membership clause, has been narrowly construed to include
active knowing membership with specific intent to overthrow the Government. Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). See also Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d
810 (9th Cir. 1961). The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-789
(1958), was an attempt to enact ". . . appropriate legislation recognizing the existence
of such a world wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its
purpose in the United States." The Communist Control Act, supra note 2, is a con-
tinuation of a policy of restriction by terminating the Party's rights, privileges and
immunities as a legal entity. See note, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 761 (1962).
31 The Communist Party contended that this statute was in violation of the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment and article I, § 9 of the federal constitution as a
bill of attainder. The Party also attacked the administrative action of New York as
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected
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affirmed the rule that it will refrain from deciding questions of constitu-
tionality when the case can be justly decided on other grounds.' 2
Justice Harlan, for the unanimous Court, invoked this rule and based
the Court's interpretation on the statute's specific wording, subsequent acts
of Congress, and the application of section 3 by the federal authorities
charged with the enforcement of the Act. It was pointed out in support of
the majority that federal authorities have continued to recognize the
Communist Party as an employer under the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act 13 and that it is undesirable to have conflicting state and federal inter-
pretations in the field of unemployment compensation as the state and
federal systems are closely integrated. 14 Also, Congress has expressly ex-
cluded the Communist Party from the definition of "employment" in the
1956 amendments of the Social Security Act15 and the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act.' 6 However, there has been no such exclusion from the
Unemployment Tax Act. It appears that the federal authorities have not
interpreted the status of employer, for the purposes of unemployment taxes,
as a right or privilege under the Communist Control Act. This interpretation
would seem to be in accord with the earlier New York decisions.17 The
Communist Control Act does not purport to deny the Party tax burdens
so the federal position does not seem inconsistent.
Does the fact that the Communist Party was a party to this con-
troversy alter the policy considerations involved in deciding this case to
a degree which is not consistent with the purpose of the statute? This may
be a point of discussion in the light of recent criticism that has been directed
against the Supreme Court concerning its attitude toward the enforcement
of anti-Communist legislation.' 8 The Supreme Court has consistently avoided
the claim of a violation of the fourteenth amendment and did not reach the other
constitutional issues.
12 See, e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., supra note 5; United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960): "This rule frees the Court from not only unnecessary
pronouncements of constitutional issues but also premature interpretations of statutes
in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy."
13 Federal Unemploment Tax Act, 68A Stat. 439 (1954), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3308
(1958).
14 The leading case on the subject is Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308
U.S. 358, 364 (1939): "[Ilt would seem to be a fair presumption that the purpose of
Congress was to have the state law as closely co-terminous as possible with its own.
To the extent that it was not, the hopes for a coordinated and integrated dual
system would not materialize."
15 Social Security Amendments of 1956, 70 Stat. 839, 42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1958).
16 Social Security Amendments of 1956, 70 Stat. 839, 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1958).
17 See cases cited supra note 9.
18 "[Tlhe trend of the decisions under Chief Justice Warren . . . seems to indicate
that the Court has once again extended the Bill of Rights to a point where it presents
great obstacles to the fight against Communism which has been carried on by the
Executive, Congress and the states." Ober, "Communism and the Court: An Exami-
nation of Recent Developments," 44 A.B.AJ. 35, 89 (1958).
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attacks on the constitutionality of such legislation by exercising similarly
narrow construction.' The Court's decision in the principal case can easily
be supported by the conflicting federal and state interpretations of the
status of an employer and the necessity for a coordinated federal-state
administration of unemployment compensation programs. The Court's
action once again serves notice to Congress that it is dealing with a situation
in which the constitutionality of such legislation is in doubt and that utmost
specificity and clarity are required.
The importance of this case lies not only in that it is the first time
the Court has had an opportunity to consider the scope and application of
the Communist Control Act,20 but also in that it spotlights an apparent
conflict between congressional intention and a Supreme Court policy in the
field of internal security legislation. By enacting section 3 of the Act, Congress
intended to restrict benefits conferred on the Communist Party under
state as well as federal law, and delegated some of the responsibility for
frustrating the Party's objectives to the states 21 The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, has expressed the opinion that the federal government is
much better equipped to deal with internal security and, because of the
existing comprehensive federal legislation in the area, there is no room for
state action 2 2 The specific wording of the Act is in direct conflict with
this doctrine of pre-emption.2 3 The existence of this conflict supports the
recent criticism of the Court for abandoning its policy of judicial self-
restraint and exercising legislative judgment in direct violation of separation
of powers.2 4 It will be interesting to see how the Court reconciles its pre-
emption doctrine in future cases involving the delegation of authority
to the states. However, it is doubtful that the broad terms "rights, privileges
and immunities" will ever be interpreted by the Court to apply to activities
which could be regulated by specific acts using narrower language.
19 See cases cited supra note 10. See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
20 United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820 (1955), rev'd, 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 942 (1958). The court suggested in dictum that the purpose
of the Act was certainly to deprive the Party of the right to nominate and place candidates
on the ballot without distinguishing between federal and state elections. See also Salwen
v. Rees, 16 NJ. 216, 108 A.2d 265 (1954), in which New Jersey precluded Communist
candidates from appearing on state ballots.
21 Ibid. See also Auerbach, "Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-
Political Theory of Free Speech," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1956).
22 In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956), the Court reviewed the
major anti-Communist legislation and said, "Taken as a whole, they envince a con-
gressional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for
the states to supplement it."
23 Ibid. The Court ruled that the Smith Act had pre-empted the field of criminal
prohibition for sedition.
24 Ober, op. cit. supra note 18.
